Dissatisfied local groups and terrorist organizations now cooperate in Mali and Niger. Shutterstock.

The Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) noose continues to tighten in Mali, with the Al Qaeda-affiliated group blockading the capital. Coordinated attacks on April 25, 2026, which claimed the Malian defense minister’s life, among many others, show the group’s potency. The extremists now control checkpoints around the capital as the Russians, upon whom the Malian military junta relied, evacuate.

Should Mali—once among Africa’s most democratic governments—fall, the ripple effects throughout the region will be severe. Geographically, Mali is huge: It is roughly the size of Texas and California combined. Seven countries border Mali, with a combined population of over 175 million. A terror base in Mali would give safe-haven and sustenance to Boko Haram. Mali lies just 600 miles from the northern border of Nigeria, through largely ungoverned or loosely governed regions.

A terror base in Mali would give safe-haven and sustenance to Boko Haram.

Just as in Somalia, the war in Mali is not a single conflict, but rather, an amalgam. Mali has long faced a Tuareg movement seeking to establish Azawad, a separatist state across the northern half of the country, centered around Gao and Timbuktu. While the Islamist rebels in southern Mali and the Tuaregs long operated as rivals, they now act as a united front against the state. The same dynamic is at play in Niger, where dissatisfied local groups and terrorist organizations now make common cause.

While some scholars have suggested the United States fill the vacuum in Mali, this is unrealistic in the current political environment. With war continuing with Iran and many Americans skeptical of force, and both Democrats and MAGA Republicans hostile to military deployments, direct U.S. action is a non-starter. After President Donald Trump ordered a U.S. withdrawal from Syria during his first term, U.S. Africa Command put out word to its officers to stay out of the news media at all costs, lest Trump realize the American presence in Africa was three times as large.

The security crisis Africa now faces dwarfs the 2014 rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. As the new White House Counterterrorism Strategy notes, the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates stretch from Mali to Somalia and down into the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. Whereas the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria could smuggle oil via Turkish brokers to gain cash, the resources within the groups’ territories in Africa extend beyond oil to gold, silver, timber, and potentially even uranium.
Just as the Pentagon partnered successfully with Syrian Kurds to roll back the Islamic State, the United States must find local, indigenous allies to be the tip of the spear against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Fortunately, three countries or groups fit the bill and could act as the tip of the spear.

The United States must find local, indigenous allies to be the tip of the spear against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.

First is Libya, or at least those portions of the country not controlled by the recognized Tripoli government. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Armed Forces successfully stabilized 70 percent of Libya, including its oil fields and export facilities; the Libyan Armed Forces likely could control the entirety of the Libyan state if the international community ceased tolerating Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba and Grand Mufti Sadiq Al-Ghariani’s provision of extremist militias with safe-haven and weaponry. Every week, Ghariani uses his influence over Qatari-financed mosques to recruit extremists in western and southern Libya for the so-called jihad in the Sahel. The U.S. Department of State should sanction Dabaiba for his two-faced protection of extremists, and target Ghariani, who is as dangerous as the late Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and Islamic State caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Second is Somaliland. Somaliland is a natural ally: Western, democratic, and secure and aligned with Israel and Taiwan against the growing threats of both Islamic extremism and China. Too many career diplomats and even Trump administration National Security Council officials, though, seek to put Somalia first. Some do so out of ignorance of history: They fail to understand the precedent of failed federations reverting to their constituent parts—Senegal and Gambia, for example—nor do they have the legal background to realize Mogadishu never ratified the agreement with Hargeisa.

Others do so out of a misguided effort to keep Somalia happy. They subscribe to the “one-Somalia” arguments put out by Mogadishu, not understanding that Somali officials merely replicate the failed strategy of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who used Arab nationalist rhetoric to distract from his own failures. Finally, some counterterrorism officials argue that siding with Somaliland would undermine Somalia’s cooperation against al-Shabaab.

[Rwanda] is the region’s Singapore against the backdrop of failed and failing states.

Such an argument falls flat. It assumes Mogadishu seeks to defeat al-Shabaab, though it has not for decades despite ample support. It also replicates the mistakes of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, in which fear of losing counter-terror support led successive U.S. administrations to indulge Pakistan, even as it supported the Taliban and sheltered bin Laden. To embrace Somaliland could mark a turning point to push back Al Qaeda and Islamic State gains in Somalia.

Third is Rwanda. While Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s State Department sanctions Rwanda and defers uncritically to Russian, French, and American progressives who launder their state and personal interests through the United Nations Group of Experts, the country is key to regional security and moderation. It is the region’s Singapore against the backdrop of failed and failing states. More importantly, Rwanda, at its own expense, has helped secure Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, the capital of the Central African Republic, and much of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Activists might disparage Rwanda’s contributions by noting investment and commerce followed, but more sober minds would applaud this: functional economies lead to functional states.

Too often, State Department Africa Bureau policy is disjointed, cobbled together by individual country teams or diplomatic fiefdoms absent any broad coherence. If Trump and Rubio want to counter the looming terror threat, it is time to approach Africa holistically and consider those partners with whom the United States can achieve its goals. The answer—Libyan Armed Forces, Somaliland, and Rwanda—will be self-evident, if only Trump, Rubio, or Congress asks the question.